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I INTRODUCTION 
The Patents Act 1953 is currently under review. According to a Ministry 
of Commerce Paper produced in 1999: 1 
[T)he Government wishes to consider the current provisions in respect to the patenting 
of life forms and the issue of whether and what type of life form inventions should be 
patentable, taking into account the Government's broader economic policy. 
3 
The focus of this essay is the reform of the Patents Act with reference to a 
particular life form: human beings. Specifically it will consider the option, 
recommended by the New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys (NZIPA) to the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification 2001, that section 17 of the Patents Act be 
repealed and that a new provision be introduced excluding humans from patentability. 2 
The new prov1s10n, according to this recommendation, should be based on the 
equivalent section in the Australian Patents Act 1990.3 Section 18 (2) of that Act 
states: "Human beings, and the biological processes for their generation, are not 
patentable inventions." 
Section 17 of the Patents Act gives the Commissioner of Patents discretion to 
refuse a patent application on the grounds that it is contrary to morality. It should be 
repealed according to the NZIP A because: "The administration of the patents system is 
not the appropriate place for ad hoe moral decisions of such magnitude to be made." 4 
The argument put forward in this essay is that the term "human being" can be 
interpreted in two ways: narrowly to refer only to a "whole" organism or broadly to 
encompass human biological material as well. Any analysis of a provision excluding 
the patenting of human beings must assess the consequences of adopting one of these 
interpretations in the light of recent developments in biotechnology. 
1 Ministry of Commerce Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions: Discussion Paper (Wellington, 1999) 4. 
2 New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys (submission to Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 200 l) 3. 
3 New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys, above, I 0. 
4 New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys, above 3. 
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Once this assessment has been made, the question can then be asked: to render 
human beings - however they are best defined - unpatentabJe, is it necessary to amend 
the Patents Act to include a specific provision or is it adequate in its present form? If 
an amendment is necessary, the provision must be one which allows New Zealand to 
fulfil its international obligations and which conforms to overseas practice. 
Finally the precise formulation of the provision put forward by the NZIP A - and 
recommended to Government by the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification - is 
evaluated. 
II RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Biotechnology or "the exploitation of biological processes for industrial and other 
purposes"5 is not a new phenomenon, but recent developments in human molecular 
biology have led to a burgeoning of new biotech industries. The range of products to 
emerge from these industries has fuelled the debate on the patenting of humans. 
A The Science of Molecular Genetics 
Many of the techniques of modem biotechnology utiJise the cellular function of 
molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 
Each DNA molecule is called a chromosome. Human beings receive a set of 23 
chromosomes from each parent: two sex chromosomes (two Xs or an X and a Y) and 
twenty two duplicates. A complete set of chromosomes reside in the nucleus of almost 
every cell type. 6 
A DNA molecule comprises two strands, each with a backbone of deoxyribose 
phosphate units to which is attached one of four bases: adenine (A), cytosine (C), 
Guanine (G) and thymine (T). The strands are held together in a double helix by 
hydrogen bonds that form between complementary pairs of bases, adenine always 
pairing with thymine and cytosine with guanine. Triplets of bases along one of the 
5 Della Thompson (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (9 ed, Clan:ndon Press, Oxford, 1995) 129. 
6 Human Genome Project Information <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/l iunum-Genome/publicat/judges/j udge.html> (last 
accessed 2 September 200 1). 
5 
strands code for one of the 20 amino acids used in protein structure; a sequence of 
triplets - a gene - coding for the synthesis of a particular protein in the cell. 7 
Proteins are essential to an orgamsm. It is from proteins that cell and tissue 
structure as well as enzymes for chemical reactions are made. 8 The mechanism by 
which protein production takes place in the cell involves two steps. First, the two 
strands of the DNA molecule separate so that the coding strand is available to act as a 
template for the construction of a ribonucleic molecule (RNA). RNA is chemically 
related to DNA but instead of deoxyribose has ribose units and instead of thymine has 
a base of uracil. This messenger RNA molecule separates from the DNA and - within 
a cell structure called the ribosome - attracts amino acids in a complementary sequence 
along its length, that sequence corresponding to the arrangement of bases along the 
original strand of DNA Between genes are long sequences of DNA bases that do not 
code for anything. Furthermore, the genes themselves do not exist in a continuous 
sequence but have stretches or exons that do code for parts of the protein and other 
stretches or introns that do not. 9 
One of the key results of the Human Genome Project was to discover that probably 
fewer than 30,000 protein-coding genes exist in the human genome although there are 
hundreds of thousands of distinct proteins. 10 By various means a single gene can 
encode multiple proteins.11 
At a DNA level, human beings are very much alike: more than 99.9 per cent 
similar according to recent estimates. 12 Some variations in the DNA base sequence 
have no effect at all, but the rest accounts for many of the physical differences between 
individuals. Furthermore, a variation in a coding sequence - inherited from a parent, 
arising spontaneously or in response to environmental factors - can disrupt the 
manufacturing of proteins and cause disease or at least increase the risk of disease 
developing. 13 
7 Philip W Grubb Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 230. 
8 HW11an Genome Project Infonnation < http://www.oml.gov/hgmis/elsi/pa tents .html> Oast accessed 2 September 2001). 
9 Grubb, above, 230-23 1. 
10 "Proteins more important than genes - researchers" (12 February 2001) Independent Newspapers Ltd 
<http:www.stuffco.nz/inl/index/O, 1008,643514a 12,FF.html> Oast accessed 20 February 200 I) . 
11 Philip Cohen "High in Protein" (4 November 2000) New Scientist United Kingdom 38-39. 
12 Kathryn Brown "Close Cousins" (4 November 2000) New Scientist United Kingdom 42 . 
13_ Denise K Casey "Genes, Dreams, and Reality" (1 999) 83 (3) Judicature 105. 
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A small percentage of disorders are caused by changes occurring in a single gene 
that is inherited from one or both parents : sickle cell anaemia or cystic fibrosis for 
instance. 14 The causes of more common diseases such as heart disease, diabetes and 
cancer are less easy to identify. These so-called "complex" diseases appear to involve 
many genes interacting with other genes and with environmental factors.15 Scientists 
believe the answer to these diseases may lie in identifying commonly occurring single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or changes in a single base or nucleotide (A, T, C or 
G) that occur about once every 1300 nucleotide bases along the genome.16 Certain 
patterns of SNPs, it is thought, may render an individual more susceptible to a disease 
and, furthermore, could influence their response to drugs and other therapies.17 
B The Technology 
Out of molecular genetics have developed many of the techniques and products of 
the new biotech industries. 
I Recombinant DNA technology 
Recombinant DNA technology encompasses the techniques of research - such as 
gene-splicing that uses enzymes to break and rejoin DNA molecules (to create 
recombinant DNA) - and specific products such as DNA sequences, which may be 
whole genes or fragments of genes. 18 Some fragments, called expressed sequence tags 
(ESTs), are pieces of laboratory made versions of genes or cDNA that contain only 
exon regions.19 Other products are proteins including insulin and human growth 
hormone, lymphokines and blood clotting factors. 20 
The technology makes possible powerful diagnostic tools such as gene or DNA 
tests allowing doctors to scan a patient's DNA for variations in sequences of bases that 
prefigure the onset of disease.21 Already tests exist for Huntington ' s disease, cystic 
fibrosis, inherited breast and ovarian cancer, Tay-Sach's disease, and phenylketonuria, 
14 Casey, as above, 105. 
15 Human Genome Project Information < http://www.oml.gov/fechResources/Human-Ge:nome/publicat/judges/judge.html > (last 
accessed 2 September 2001). 
16 Kathryn Brown "Close Cousins" (4 November 2000) New Scientist United Kingdom 44. 
17 Brown, above, 45. 
18 Philip W Gmbb Patents for Chemicals, Phan11ace11ticals and Biotechnology (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 233. 
19 Gmbb, above, 232. 
20 Gmbb, above, 234. 
21 Denise K Casey "Genes, Dreams, and Real ity" (1999) 83 (3) Jurucature 105. 
7 
among others. One type of DNA test involves creating probes - short pieces of DNA 
sequences - that will bind with a mutated sequence in the patient's sample. Another 
involves biochemical tests that screen for gene products such as enzymes and other 
proteins. 22 
Increased knowledge of genetic sequences and protein structure holds out the 
promise of better therapies: of vastly more effective drugs with fewer side effects,23 for 
instance, and of gene transfer whereby defective genes are replaced or supplemented 
by others to treat or prevent disease - or to modify such traits as height, weight, 
stamina and even intelligence.24 Such therapy can alter somatic (body) or germ (egg 
and sperm) cells. If somatic gene therapy takes place only that individual is affected. 
By contrast changes are passed on to offspring in germline gene therapy. 25 
Already the techniques of gene transfer are used to insert human genes into animals 
("transgenics") such as sheep, goats and cows so that they may be "pharmed" for the 
large quantities of human proteins they subsequently produce. Transgenics may also be 
used to model human diseases.26 Other developments include using animals such as 
pigs to grow organs with human genes to render them more acceptable on 
transplantation to a host human being. This is xenotransplantation. 27 
In future, cloning of human material may allow the production of whole organs 
from single cells. In somatic cell nuclear transfer, genetic material from the nucleus of 
a body cell is injected into an egg cell from which the nucleus along with its genetic 
material has been removed. The cell divides as a human embryo develops. The 
remarkable feature of very young embryonic cells (or stem cells) is that they are non-
specialised but eventually turn into every kind of tissue. This means that new tissue 
could be grown to replace diseased or damaged parts of the body, providing cures for 
Parkinson's, diabetes, Alzheimer's and paralysis. Furthennore organ rejection would 
be eliminated by using the patient's own body cells as adult specialised cells could be 
22 Human Genome Project Information< http://\>,'WW.ornl.gov/TecbResources/Human-Genome/publicat/judges/judge.htrnl > Oast 
accessed 2 September 200 I). 
23 Kathryn Brown "Close Cousins" (4 November 2000) New Scientist United Kingdom 45. 
24 Casey, above, I 05. 
25 Maxwell J Mehlman "Gene Therapy and Beyond" 1999 83(3) Judicature 124. 
26 Casey, above, 105. 
27 Casey, above, 105. 
8 
made to revert to an undifferentiated state. 28 At present, the main source of embryonic 
stems cells is embryos not required by IVF clinics. Cloning embryos would provide an 
unlimited source of material for research.29 
2 Monoclonal antibody technology 
Although some writers appear to equate biotechnology and its human applications 
with genetic engineering or recombinant DNA technology, others more accurately 
include monoclonal antibody technology. 30 This technology relies on the working of 
the immune system. White blood cells originating as stem cells in the bone marrow 
differentiate into B-lymphocytes and T-lymphocytes. B-lymphocytes produce 
antibodies, proteins which bind themselves to foreign protein molecules or antigens 
rendering them inactive. 31 
Antibodies can be used therapeutically, to supplement an individual's immune 
system, but also as diagnostic and research tools. To date, some diagnostic techniques 
and a few commercially successful therapies have been developed using this 
technology. 32 
III PATENT LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
No express reference to biotechnological inventions occurs in the Patents Act, 
which is the primary source of patent law in New Zealand. Unsurprisingly therefore 
the Act neither expressly prohibits nor expressly allows that human beings fall within 
the range of patentable subject matter. 
To be eligible for patent protection, the subject matter of a claim must be an 
invention as defined by section 2 of the Act: 
28 Hwnan Genome Project Information <http:://www.ornl .gov/TecbResources/Hwnan-Genome/elsi/cloning.html .> (last accessed 2 
September 2001). 
29 Nancy Gibbs "Baby It's You! And You, and You» (19 February 2001) TIME United States 44 . 
30 Philip W Grubb Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 238. 
31 Grubb, above, 238-239. 
32 Grubb, above, 242. 
"Invention" means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and 
grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or 
process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture; and includes 
an alleged invention. 
9 
Section 10 (7) of the Patents Act provides that a claim cannot extend to a substance 
when found in nature. A grant may be opposed on grounds provided by section 21 of 
the Act including a lack of novelty (subsections a to d), obviousness and lack of 
inventive step (subsection e). The invention must also be industrially applicable. 33 
IV THE EFFECT OF A SPECIFIC PROVISION EXCLUDING HUMAN BEINGS 
FROM PATENTABILITY 
The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification acknowledges in its report that 
"[t]he debate on patenting living organisms also covers the identifying and 
characterising of particular biological molecules or genes. "34 In so far as the debate 
relates to human beings, therefore, it covers the patenting of human biological material 
(or to use the Royal Commission's phrase "human related matter"35) as well as human 
beings as whole organisms. This means that the effect of a specific exception 
excluding human beings from patentability depends on how the term "human being" is 
interpreted. 
A A Narrow Definition of "Human Being" 
I Two versions of a narrow definition 
Irrefutably, the term "human being" refers at least to a human organism from birth 
onwards. This is the definition of "human being as organism" at its narrowest. Some 
would argue that the definition should be slightly wider and encompass the organism at 
an earlier stage of its development: at conception or as an embryo or foetus. 
Proponents of either version of the narrow definition of hwnan being would deny the 
tenn applies to human biological materl . 
33 Ministry ofCommerceRefonn of the Patents Act 1953: Proposed Recommendations (Wellington 1992) 6. 
34 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (Wellington 2001) 282 . 
15 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, above, 284. 
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2 Arguments for a narrow definition 
(a) Individual rewards and societal benefits 
One of the strongest arguments in favour of a narrow definition relates to the 
purpose of patent law, which is often described in terms of a bargain struck between 
innovators and the public at large. 36 In exchange for complete disclosure of 
information at the beginning of the patent term (20 years) innovators are granted 
exclusive rights to "make, use, exercise and vend a manner of new manufacture in 
New Zealand."37 A patent system rewards those who invest their resources in research 
and development while it promotes public access to new information and technology. 
Patent protection means inventions are less likely to be retained as trade secrets, an 
exercise that can be both costly and difficult and that may result in wasteful duplication 
of effort. 
Benefits to society at large go beyond access to new technologies, according to this 
view. As the information store grows with new disclosures, further innovation takes 
place resulting in new jobs and industries and increasing economic growth. There is 
some evidence to suggest that the stronger a country' s patent protection, the higher the 
level of its industrial development. 38 
If a definition of human being is adopted that restricts the meaning of the term to 
an organism at birth and beyond, then public access to the widest range of technologies 
is more likely to occur. A very narrow definition allows the patenting of biological 
material such as DNA sequences and thereby encourages the development of 
diagnostic and therapeutic techniques and products that use this material. Amongst the 
techniques promoted are DNA tests for inherited diseases such as cystic fibrosis and, 
perhaps, for complex diseases such as cancer and heart disease. Therapy by means of 
gene transfer techniques and the use of more effective drugs is encouraged, as is 
xenotransplantation and the pharming of transgenic animals for human proteins. The 
potential of monoclonal antibody technology is also more likely to be realised. 
Furthermore, with better treatments available, patients need fewer routine medical 
36 Ministry of Commerce Refonn of the Patents Act 1953: Proposed Recommendations (Wellington 1992) 3. 
37 Patents Regulations 1954 Third Schedule Letters Patent. 
38 Philip W Grubb Patents f or Chemicals, Phan11aceutica/s and Biotechnology (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1999) 49. 
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examinations and are less likely to be hospitalised for long periods. The burden on the 
health system is reduced considerably. 39 
If the status of human being is achieved by an organism before birth, then research 
into embryonic stem cells is threatened along with the development of techniques to 
provide replacement tissue for damaged or diseased body parts and cures for 
degenerative diseases such as Parkinson' s and Alzheimer' s. 
(b) Moral concerns 
The precise point at which an orgamsm becomes a human being cannot be 
determined solely by reference to the quantity of economic or biomedical gains to be 
made. Moral concerns are also relevant. 40 Restricting "human being" to its narrowest 
reference might be regarded as promoting the dignity of the human organism at least 
from birth onwards. However, the Roman Catholic Church teaches that conception 
marks the point at which a soul - and thereby a human being - is created. According 
to the United States Director of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' 
Commission on Science and Human Values: "Each embryo is a human being simply 
by dint of its genetic makeup.',41 A recent survey by New Zealand's Independent 
Biotechnology Council (IBAC) suggests this view is prevalent in the community at 
large. "People . . . were almost universally opposed to the cloning of people,',42 the 
Chair of IBAC is reported as saying. It is interesting to note however that this view is 
less strongly held when the potential benefits of research on stem cells are made 
apparent: "When it came to the cloning of embryos for use in stem cell research that 
had potential medical benefits ... people were less certain. ,,43 
(c) Statutory consistency 
Defining a human being as an organism from birth onwards would achieve 
consistency with the only definition of the term in New Zealand statutory law. 
According to section 159 (1) of the Crimes Act 1961, the status of human being is 
achieved when a child has completely proceeded in a living state from the body of its 
39 Royal Conunission on Genetic Modification Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (Wellington 200 I) 243 . 
40 See B Belcher and G Hawtin A Patent on Life (International Development Research Centre, Canada, 1991) 20, for a discussion 
on the ethics of patenting plants and animals. 
41 Nancy Gibbs "Baby, it ' s you ! And you, and you .... " (19 February 2001) TIME 44. 
42 Mark Revington "Life in New Zealand" (11 August 2001) The Listener New Zealand 22. 
43 Revington, above, 22. 
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mother, whether it has breathed or not, whether it has independent circulation or not, 
and whether the navel cord is severed or not. 
B A Broad Definition of "Human Being" 
A provision excluding human beings from patentability may be also interpreted 
broadly to encompass human biological material including cells, genes and gene 
fragments , SNPs and proteins as well as human beings as entire organisms. 
1 Arguments for a broad definition 
(a) Patenting life 
One of the most frequently articulated arguments in favour of adopting a broad 
interpretation assumes that a patent on human material grants property rights in a piece 
of nature. 44 It imagines that patents will take away from people ownership of the body 
parts they are currently using such as sequences of DNA bases or proteins like insulin. 
Acting on this assumption - and to highlight a perceived invasion of privacy - a 
woman in Britain applied to patent her own DNA. 45 Her assumption, it seems, is 
shared by many New Zealanders: "[A] common public concern about gene 
modification," the Royal Commission on Genetic Engineering noted after hearing 
numerous submissions, "relates to the legitimacy of 'owning life'." 46 
The standard response to this concern is to state that it is based on a 
misapprehension of the scope of intellectual property rights : they do not extend to 
naturally occurring products or "laws of nature". 47 Thjs "product of nature" doctrine is 
enshrined in Section 10(7) and follows from the requirements of patentability -
novelty, inventive step, utility or manner of new manufacture. Accordingly patents 
may be granted for isolated and purified DNA sequences as opposed to genes as they 
occur naturally on the chromosome. Mere discoveries are not patentable. 
This argument forms part of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California in 
44 Diana McCw-dy "For sale: your genes" (7 July 200 1) The Dominion Wellington 3. 
4
l Andrew Brown "America Holds the Cards" (1 5 November 2000) The Guardian London. 
46 Royal Commission on Genetic Modifica tion Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (Wellington 2001) 283 . 
47 See Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, as above, 283 . 
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Moore v Regents of the University of California. 48 In denying that the plaintiff had any 
claim to a cell-line and its products (which had been developed from his excised spleen 
cells and patented by researchers), it argued that the patented cell-line was "both 
factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore' s body."49 The 
researchers had isolated Moore's T-lymphocytes and cloned a cell-line that 
overproduced lymphokines, a task generally regarded as difficult. It was "this inventive 
effort that patent law rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring raw 
materials."50 The other reasons were based on the Court's finding that neither case law 
nor California statutory law suggested that a person retains sufficient interest in 
excised cells to support a cause of action for conversion when the cells are used for 
medical research.51 Furthermore, to expand conversion law would inhibit socially 
beneficial research. 52 
In his dissenting opinion, however, Mosk J detennined that California statutory law 
did not extinguish all of a person's property rights in his or her excised cells53 and that, 
at the very least, Moore retained the right to use his cells for the same purposes as the 
defendants. 54 Mosk J found a continuity existed between the naturally occurring 
product and the patented cell-line. In fact, he claimed, no physical distinction existed 
between Moore's cells and the cell line: the cell-line merely extended the life of the 
cells. 55 Mosk J did not deny that the defendants had an interest in the cell-line - their 
ingenuity had been primarily responsible for its existence - but he also asserted that 
Moore had made a crucial contribution.56 "A patent", Mosk J concluded is "not a 
license to defraud."57 To achieve a just and equitable solution, he suggested, Moore 
might be regarded as a joint inventor. 58 
What Mosk J does, in effect, is to blur the distinction between a piece of nature and 
the subject matter of a patent raising the question: should the inventor's intellectual 
property rights extinguish whatever proprietary interest a donor retains in his or her 
48 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479 (Cal). 
49 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 492 Panelli J. 
50 lv/oore v Regents of the University a/California, above, 493 Panelli J. 
51 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 489 Panelli J. 
52 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 494 Panelli J. 
53 Moore v Regents of the University ofCalifomia, above, 509 Mosk J. 
54 Moore v Regents of the University of Califomia, above, 510, Mosk J. 
55 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 511 Mosk J. 
56 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 511 Mosk J. 
51 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 512 Mosk J. 
58 Moore v Regents of the University o/Califomia, above, 512 Mosk J. 
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body parts? It can be argued that this is a question that only appears reasonable when 
posed in a case like Moore v Regents of the University of California where just one 
donor is involved and that typically the raw material of a genetic product is from 
multiple human sources. 59 In theory, however, this should make no difference to the 
question of ownership of the material, only to how much it is worth. If anyone's DNA 
will do, for example, then its market value might be correspondingly low. 
(b) Devaluing human beings 
A related argument in favour of adopting a broad definition suggests that extending 
patent eligibility threatens to devalue human life. It is based on the supposition that 
molecular structure - especially of the genome - determines what it is to be human. As 
Alex Mauron writes:60 
With the complete human genome now at hand, the notion that our genome is 
synonymous with our humanness is gaining strength. This view is a kind of ' genomic 
metaphysics': the genome is viewed as the core of our nature, determining both our 
individuality and our species identity. 
Yet this reductive approach to being human ignores other defining components of 
our identity such as culture.61 It also exaggerates the uniqueness of human beings at 
the genetic level. Research has shown that we share varying numbers of our genes 
with other organisms: on average a startling 85 per cent with mice and 98 per cent with 
apes.62 
(c) Environmental concerns 
One of the arguments for imposing a complete ban on the patenting of human 
biological material is that it promotes research that puts the environment at risk. 
Currently the debate in New Zealand centres on the insertion of synthetic copies of 
human genes into animals such as cows to produce milk rich in a particular protein. 
Environmentalists fear that by crossing the species divide in this way, researchers are 
59 Brett J Trout "Patent Law - A Patient Seeks a Portion of the Biotechnological Patent Profits in Moore v Regents of the 
University ofCaJjfornia" (1992)17 JCorpL 513, 531. 
60 Alex Mauron "Is the Genome the Secular Eqwvalent of the Soul?" (2 Febrnary 2001) Science Uruted States 831 . 
61 Alex Mauron, above, 831 . 
62 Human Genome Project Information <http://www.ornl.giv/hgmis/faq/compgen.html> (last accessed 2 September 200 I). 
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threatening the wellbeing of whole planet. The ultimate consequences of this research 
are unknown, but could be perilous.63 
The simplest way of refuting this argument is to assert that granting a patent does 
not authorise the patent holder to use the technology but merely to prevent others from 
doing so. Environmental considerations are best dealt with by such organisations as 
the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) operating within appropriate 
environmental legislation such as Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 
1996. 
(d) Impeding research 
More powerful arguments arise when the practical effects of extending patents in 
this area are considered. Although, theoretically, a bargain exists at the heart of patent 
law it does not necessarily mean that public good will always flow from the granting of 
property rights. 
About 30 years ago, one of the justifications for granting private property rights 
was described metaphorically by Garrett Hardin as the "tragedy of the commons".64 
According to this theory, a resource held in common is susceptible to overuse because 
an individual gains no benefit by restricting his or her use of that resource while others 
cannot be excluded. "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all",65 wrote Hardin. It has 
been argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the privatisation of biomedical 
research could bring about a "tragedy of the anticommons": if multiple owners each 
have an exclusive right to a particular piece of a resource, no one can use it or at least 
not very effectively. 66 
In the area of genetics, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have identified ways 
in which such a tragedy might occur. Two of their examples involve the patenting of 
results "upstream" in the research and development process, specifically the patenting 
of gene fragments for which no protein or biological function has been identified. Any 
downstream product such as a therapeutic protein or a genetic diagnostic test is likely 
63 see Mark Revington "Life in New Zealand" (11 August 200 I) The Listener New Zealand 22. 
64 Garrett Hardin "Extensions of 'The Tragedy of the Commons'" (I May 1998) Science United States 589. 
6
~ Garrett Hardin, above, 589. 
00 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg "Can Patents Deter Innovation?" ( I May l 998) Science United States 698. 
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to incorporate more than one fragment, they argue, requmng a pharmaceutical 
company to engage in costly negotiations with multiple patent holders before 
accumulating sufficient licenses to use that research effectively in developing a 
product. Costs will be driven even higher if patent holders overestimate the value of 
the fragment they own or if there is no substitute for a particular fragment. Costs will 
also be incurred in identifying the patents that apply. As costs increase and the 
outcome remains unsure, product development may be abandoned altogether.67 
The second example arises when pharmaceutical companies attempt to test the 
efficacy of a new product by screening it against relevant biochemical receptors. If 
different companies own the receptors, the task of gathering licenses may be so 
arduous that pharmaceutical companies choose to develop less promising products or, 
instead of screening the product, conduct clinical tests that expose people to 
unnecessary risk. 68 
One response to this argument is to address the particular subject matter of the 
examples - gene fragments for which no function has been identified - and suggest 
that such material is unlikely to be patented because the utility requirement would not 
have been met. However, the strength of Heller and Eisenberg' s argument is 
illustrated by the actual outcome of the patenting of two genes for which the function 
has been determined. Myriad Inc developed a technique to identify mutations in two 
genes that, if present in a woman, indicate an 80% chance of her developing breast 
cancer. They patented the technique and the genes known as BRACI and BRAC2. In 
the United States, this has given Myriad a monopoly over BRCA screening.69 In 
Britain and Europe, other screening methods that depend on identifying the genes but 
which are simpler and cheaper - or simply more effective in some cases 70- are under 
threat. If these methods are forced out of the market, a large proportion of the public 
will be deprived of the benefit of early diagnosis of breast cancer. 
67 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, above, 699. 
68 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, above, 699. 
69 James Meek "Money and the meaning of life" (17 January 2000) The Guardian United Kingdom. 
70 Michael Balter "Transatlantic War Over BRAC I Patent" (8 June 200 1) Science United States 181 . 
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Another impediment to product development is patent stacking whereby a single 
DNA sequence can be patented as an EST, and gene and a SNP. Using that sequence 
means paying licensing costs to all the patent owners which might prove prohibitive.71 
A "tragedy of the anticommons" is not the inevitable result of allowing human 
biological material to be patented but it does point to the need to consider seriously the 
effects of granting rights in inventions arising out of "upstream" research such as gene 
fragments and also SNPs. 
C Summtiry 
In summary, there are strong arguments for both the narrow and broad 
interpretation of "human being". The process of evaluating the strength of each 
position is complicated by the varying nature of the arguments. How, for example, can 
an estimate of economic growth be weighed against a concept of human identity 
deriving from moral beliefs? If conventional wisdom is right, however, and more 
biomedical gains are to be made by allowing patenting than by not, then the balance of 
the arguments swings in favour of a narrow interpretation of human being - if only 
because alleviating suffering is generally regarded as a moral good. A provision that 
excludes human beings from patentability on this analysis should therefore refer to 
whole organisms at least from birth. 
V INADEQUACIES OF THE PATENT ACT IF SECTION 17 JS REPEALED 
The question must next be asked: in order to exclude human beings as whole 
organisms from patentability is it necessary to amend the Patents Act? 
In its report, the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification expresses the opinion 
that "under existing New Zealand legislation and practice it is unlikely that a patent 
covering human beings would be granted." A specific provision is "desirable" only "to 
put the issue beyond doubt".72 Section 17, the morality section, is cited as the basis of 
the Patent Office ' s policy to refuse a patent application for humans. If section 17 is 
71 Human Genome Proj ect lnfonnation <http://www.ornl .gov/hgmis/elsi/patents.html> Oast accessed 2 September 200 1). 
n Royal Comrnjssion on Genetic Modjfication Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (Wellington 200 I) 284 . 
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repealed as recommended by the NZIP A, then the statutory basis for the Office's 
policy will be swept aside on this analysis. 
A Product of Nature 
According to the Royal Commission, at least two other sections exist in the Patents 
Act to prevent the patenting of a human: "sections 2 and 10(7) prevent the patenting of 
a substance found in nature". 73 The relevance of section 10(7) and of section 2 - as it 
is characterised by the Royal Commission - is not altogether clear. It is not human 
beings as they are found "in nature" that are at risk. It is human beings whose genomes 
have been modified by therapy or who been "constructed" in vitro. 
B "Manner of manufacture" 
Nonetheless there is an argument that it is not necessary to enact a 
specific provision even if section 17 is repealed because: 74 
[T]he Intellectual Property Office has a practice of excluding human beings from 
patentability on the basis that human beings cannot be regarded as a "manner of 
manufacture" and therefore do not fall within the definition of invention contained in the 
Patents Act. 
The inadequacy of this argument is suggested by a decision of the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Canada and two cases heard before the New Zealand Court of Appeal. 
1 President and fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 
In President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of 
Patents), 75 the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada considered the patentability of non-
human mammals, specifically a transgenic mouse: the University of Harvard's 
"oncomouse". 
Although Rothstein JA denied in the concluding - and obiter - statements of his 
judgment that the Court's decision in favour of the appellant did not have any 
73 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, above, 284 . 
74 Ministry of Commerce Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions : Discussion Paper (Wellington 1999) 14. 
15 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patenls) (2000) CA 98. 
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implications for the patentability of humans ("clearly ... the Patent Act cannot be 
extended to cover human beings"76) , it is arguable that his analysis of the issue could 
readily be used to extend Canada' s Patent Act even further. As Mark Perry and Priti 
Krishna write: "Although the court pronounced on the oncomouse patent application, 
this decision goes much deeper. [It] open[s] the door to patent claims on other life-
forms that have been genetically modified .... "77 As it stands, the decision opens the 
door to claims on genetically modified human beings. 
Rothstein JA' s analysis rests on characterising the issue as one of pure statutory 
interpretation: " [A]ll that is at issue in this appeal is the interpretation of the Patent Act 
and the determination of whether, on the basis of the evidence, the appellant's product 
is patentable in accordance with that interpretation."78 Policy concerns, which might 
prompt a distinction being made between lower and higher life forms, are not matters 
of the courts, such questions being better addressed by Parliament. 79 
A proper interpretation of the Patent Act will take account of its object, which is 
"to promote the development of inventions in a manner that benefits both the inventor 
and the public. "80 The Act does not expressly provide for "the type of claims at issue 
here", that is to say, "new life form[s]"81 nor for biotechnological inventions generally. 
Consequently (following previous observations of the Supreme Court of Canada) new 
life forms will only constitute patentable subject matter if they meet the traditional 
· c. 82 requirements 1or a patent. 
According to Rothstein JA those requirements derive from the definition of 
"invention" in section 2 of the Patent Act as well as section 28.3 that provides the 
subject-matter of the patent must not have been obvious to persons skilled in the art or 
science.83 Section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act provides:" ' invention ' means any new 
and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new 
76 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) , above, para 207. 
77 Mark Peny and Priti Krishna "Making Sense ofMouse Tales" (2001) 23(4) EIPR 196. 
711 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 110. 
79 President and Fellaws of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) above, para 110. 
80 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 106. 
81 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 111 . 
8'l President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, paras l l l - 11 2. 
83 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para I 13 . 
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and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter." 
The oncomouse was new, useful and unobvious, the Court of Appeal decided. It 
was not an art, process or machine but did fall within the scope of the term 
"composition of matter".84 Whether or not it could also be a "manufacture" was not 
finally determined. 85 
In support of its decision to define a non-human mammal as a "composition of 
matter" the Court advanced the following reasons: 
• A core concept of patent law is that inventions are "unanticipated and 
unforeseeable".86 The courts should therefore honour Parliament's intention, as 
evidenced by the broad and general language used, that the Patent Act should be 
interpreted expansively rather than restricted in scope. In other words:87 
[T]he doctrine of contemporanea expositio - that the meaning of words in an enactment 
will be understood in the sense which they bore when the enactment was passed ... does 
not apply to the definition of 'invention' in the Patent Act. 
• The fertilized mouse egg injected with the oncogene, the resulting "founder" 
mouse and its offspring - at least those that carried the oncogene - fall within the 
definition of"composition of matter" used in Chakrabarty to include "all compositions 
of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of 
chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, 
or solids. "88 This is because the fertilized mouse egg injected with the oncogene is 
biological matter combined with physical substance (DNA). It continues to be a 
"composition of matter" as it develops to term in the host mouse. Offspring oncomice 
are also compositions of matter by virtue of the oncogene they carry.89 
84 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 114. 
s.s President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 114. 
86 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 142. 
87 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, paras 188-189. 
88 Quoted in President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 115. 
89 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, paras 121-122. 
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• Living things are not excluded from the definition "composition of matter". 90 
The court therefore concluded: "the Patent Act does not exclude living organisms, 
i.e. non-human mammals from the definition of ' invention '."91 
To a possible objection that the oncomouse could not be an invention but was 
instead a discovery because its production followed the laws of nature - in its gestation 
within a host mouse and in its reproduction by natural means as an offspring 
oncomouse - Rothstein JA responds: " [T]he use of the laws of nature by inventors 
does not disqualify a product from being an invention, provided inventiveness or 
ingenuity is also involved. "92 In the case of the oncomouse, ingenuity is involved at a 
molecular level with the assembly of the oncogene and at a cellular level by 
"incorporating it into the plasmid and injecting the plasmid into the zygote. "93 
In effect, according to Mark Perry and Priti Krishna: 94 
The Appeal Court is saying that there is no distinction between living and non-living 
inventions, at least as far as patent law is concerned. The argument is that the "creator" 
of the modified gene is to be given a patent on the whole animal as it is made up of these 
genes. 
To assess the possible impact of this decision in New Zealand with respect to the 
patenting of human beings, it is necessary to look at the law as it currently stands. 
2 Implications for New Zealand 
The requirements for patentability, it can be argued, are much the same in New 
Zealand as in Canada and therefore the approach in President and Fellows of Harvard 
College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) might well be followed by New Zealand 
courts to allow patenting of higher life forms - given that in our Act too there is no 
express prohibition on the patenting of biotechnological inventions. 
90 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Pate11ts), above, para 123. 
91 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissio11er of Patenls), above, para 123. 
92 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Ca11ada (Commissioner of Palenls) , above, para 129. 
93 Presidenl and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), above, para 129. 
94 Mark Perry and Priti Krishna "Making Sense of Mouse Tales" (2001) 23(4) EIPR 196,202. 
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The language of definition in section 2 of our Patents Act is similarly broad: "any 
manner of new manufacture", "any new method or process" indicating an expansive 
approach to its interpretation is also appropriate. 
A particular genetically engineered mammal in New Zealand would also be new, 
useful, and unobvious as the oncomouse was found to be in Canada. 
Admittedly there are points of difference, the major one being the omission of the 
term "composition of matter" from section 2 of the New Zealand Act. Instead the 
invention must be a "manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant 
of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies". 
Whether this is a sufficient obstacle to extending the categories of patentable 
subject matter is debatable. First, it should be noted that the Canadian Court did not 
rule out the possibility that the oncomouse, as well as being "composition of matter" 
might also be a "manner of manufacture". Secondly, New Zealand case Jaw suggests it 
is an obstacle that might well be overcome. 
3 Wellcome Foundation v Patents Commissioner 
The case of Wellcome Foundation v Patents Commissioner95 concerned a claim for 
treating meningeal leukemia or neoplasms in the brain by use of a known compound 
that had previously been used to treat malaria. 
The fundamental question that had to be addressed by both the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal was whether a patent could be granted in New Zealand for a method 
of treatment of disease or illness in human beings. The Assistant Commissioner of 
Patents had refused to grant a patent on the grounds that the claims did not constitute a 
"manner of new manufacture". 
The approach of Davison CJ in the High Court was to take into account the "full 
definition"96 of the term by looking at it in the light of section 6 of the Statute of 
95 Wei/come Foundation v Patents Commissioner [1983] 3 NZLR 385 (CA). 
96 Wei/come Foundation v Patents Commissioner (1979] 2 NZLR 591 ,6 10 (HC) Davison CJ. 
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Monopolies 1623. The statute prohibited monopolies but for the following exception: 
97 
Provided also, and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration before mentioned 
shall not extend to any letters patents and grants of privilege for the term of 14 years or 
under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such 
manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters patents and grants shall 
not use, so as also they be not contrary to the law or mischievous to the State, by raising 
prices of commodities at home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient: the said 14 
years to be accomplished from the date of the first letters patent or grant of such 
privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be 
if this Act had never been made, and of none other. 
Davison CJ's approach endorsed the analysis of the High Court of Australia in 
National Research Development Corporation's Application,98 which had earlier found 
approval in Swift & Co. v Commissioner of Patents as one that "must be of enormous 
public benefit and which must encourage the practical use of the startling discoveries 
of present-day scientific research. "99 
In National Research Development Corporation's Application (NRDC), the Court 
had held with respect to the equivalent section in Australian Patents Act: 100 
The word 'manufacture' finds a place in the present Act, not as a word intended to 
reduce a question of patentability to a question of verbal interpretation, but simply as the 
general title found in the Statute of Monopolies for the whole category under which all 
grants of patents which may be made in accordance with the developed principles of 
patent law are to be subsumed. 
Embracing an expansive approach, Davison CJ allowed the application for a patent, 
noting that policy matters could be imported into the process of determining whether 
the subject matter of a claim was patentable. He cited the three matters or limitation on 
grants in the Statute of Monopolies: they must not be contrary to the law, be 
91 Wei/come Foundation v Palents Commissioner, above, 610. 
98 National Research Developmenl Corporation 's App/icalion, (196 l) 102 CLR 252 (HCA). 
99 Swift & Co. v Commissioner of Patents, [ 1960] NZLR 775, 779 (SC) Barrowclough CJ. 
100 National Research Developmenl Corpora/ion 's Application, above, 269. 
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mischievous to the State by raising commodities at home or hurt trade, or be generally 
inconvenient. 101 
The decision of the High Court was reversed by the Court of Appeal. On the 
particular issue of granting patents for methods of treating human illness, the law in 
New Zealand and elsewhere in the Commonwealth had not evolved as far as Davison 
CJ had supposed. Cooke J (as he then was) suggested any change in the law on this 
issue was best left to Parliament given the requirement to balance competing 
policies. 102 Nonetheless he did not disagree that a strict verbal interpretation of the 
term "manner of manufacture" was inappropriate: 103 
"Manner of new manufacture" is an expression having no ordinary meaning today. It is 
a commonplace that the scope of the idea can only be ascertained by seeing how far the 
law has evolved in the decided cases, and that trend has been to broaden the scope 
gradually. 
If the subject matter of the claim in Wellcome Foundation v Patents Commissioner 
is left aside, then it can be argued the Court of Appeal did not dismiss the general 
approach of the High Court. As an approach to patentability that adheres to statutory 
interpretation, like the Canadian decision, but which is nonetheless expansive as it 
embraces the generality of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, it overcomes any 
obstacle to the patentability of genetically engineered mammals - including human 
beings - posed by the phrase "manner of manufacture". It must be acknowledged, 
however, that this approach can also be used to argue the contrary proposition. By 
incorporating policy considerations into the "full definition of the term", it is not 
inevitable that patents for higher organisms will be granted. Indeed the patenting of 
higher organisms, especially human beings, is the very kind of issue that the Court of 
Appeal - as it then was - might well have left to Parliament. 
101 Wellcome Foundation v Patents Commissioner (1979] 2 NZLR 591,613 (HC) Davison CJ. 102 Wei/come Foundation v Patents Commissioner, above, 391 Cooke J. 
103 Wei/come Foundation v Patents Commissioner (1983) 3 NZLR 385 (CA) Cooke J. 
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4 Pharmaceutical Management Agency v Commissioner of Patents 
A recent decision of the Court Appeal in Pharmaceutical Management Agency v 
Commissioner of Patent./04 partially overruled the decision in Wellcome Foundation v 
Patents Commissioner by allowing that the discovery of a new pharmaceutical use for 
compounds already known to be effective in the treatment of one or more particular 
medical conditions could be recognised as an invention. 
Gault J agrees with the decision in the NRDC case in rejecting the requirement that 
an invention be for a ' vendible product' and approves the way that courts "have 
flexibly and more broadly construed the concept to accommodate innovation in new 
fields of technology." 105 
He suggests that considerations of policy should not determine whether or not 
something falls within the scope of the term "invention" . " [I]t is not clear," he writes 
"how much of the proviso (if anything) beyond the term ' manner of new manufactures, 
as construed in its context is incorporated into our statutory definition of 
' invention '."106 In particular, the incorporation of the exceptions within the proviso (for 
example, the exclusion of inventions which are "generally inconvenient") is 
questionable. Consequently Gault J can dismiss the exercise of the court below in 
weighing up "the competing claims for public utility" before coming to a conclusion as 
"unnecessary.,, 107 
Like the court in President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents) he denies the relevance of policy matters in considering 
what constitutes an invention and like them purports to adhere instead to a strict 
interpretation of statute. His interpretation, however, depends on ignoring the 
exceptions within the proviso of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Returning to 
the issue at hand he concludes: 108 
What emerges from this is that it no longer can be said that a method of treating humans 
cannot be an invention . . . . The exclusion from patentability of methods of medical 
treatment rests on policy (moral) grounds. 
104 Pharmaceutical Management Agency v Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2NZLR 529 (CA). 105 Pharmaceutical Management Agency v Commissioner of Patents, above, 536 Gault J. 106 Pham,aceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, above, 528 Gault J. 107 
Phannaceutical M anagemen/ Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, above, 533 Gault J. 108 Pham,aceutical lvfanagement Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, above, 538 Gault J. 
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If the discretion for the Patent Commissioner to refuse a grant on moral grounds 
derives solely from section 17 and that section is repealed, the way is indeed clear in 
New Zealand for the patenting of higher organisms including human beings. 
It might be argued that the general prohibition on the patenting of methods of 
medical treatment still exists, and that this represents an impediment to patenting 
genetically engineered human beings. The decision in Pharmaceutical Management 
Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, so the argument might go, is confined to the 
drug manufacturing process. Yet the genetically engineered human organism is best 
regarded - like the oncomouse - not as a method of medical treatment but a 
consequence of it. The prohibition is not directly relevant. 
The Canadian Court of Appeal recognised that its approach might be regarded as 
opening up the possibility of patenting human beings as organisms. It asserted that the 
Patent Act could not apply to human beings : "Patenting is a form of ownership of 
property. Ownership concepts cannot be extended to human beings." 109 The Court 
identified section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as safeguarding 
an individual ' s liberty and, supposedly, freedom from patentability. New Zealand, by 
contrast, does not have an entrenched Bill of Rights. Furthermore the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, which according to its long title exists to " affirm, protect, and 
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand", applies only to the 
actions of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. A specific 
exclusion for human beings from patentability would therefore seem essential. 
The form of the exclusion must be one that takes into account New Zealand' s 
international obligations. 
109 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2000) CA 98 para 207. 
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VI INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
As a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), New Zealand must comply 
with the provisions of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs), 110 the most comprehensive, multilateral agreement on intellectual 
property to date. 
Article 1.1 states that the standards of protection set out in the agreement are 
obligatory but minimum standards: "Members may . . . implement in their law more 
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement." The scope of patentable 
subject matter is outlined in Article 27.1 which makes clear that member nations must 
make patents available for biotechnological innovations provided the usual tests of 
patentability are met: 
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. 
(According to Note 5 "For the purposes of this Article, the terms 'inventive step' 
and 'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous 
with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively.") 
Three exceptions are permitted by the Agreement. The first contained in Article 
27.2 includes inventions that, if commercially exploited, would be contrary to "ordre 
public" or morality. "Ordre public" is not defined, though Philip Grubb suggests that 
under German law "it would mean a violation of a basic constitutional right such as the 
right to life, personal freedom, human dignity, and freedom from bodily harm. Ordre 
public means the proper order of society". 111 Particular mention is made in Article 27.2 
of the necessity of protecting human, animal or plant life or health and avoiding serious 
environmental risk. 
Other permitted exceptions to patentability are provided in Article 27.3 (a): 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; 
110 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (Annex 1 C, World Trade Organisation, Marrakesh 
Agreement) signed 15 April 1994 and came into effect 1 January 1995 (TRJPs). 
111 Philip W Grubb Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1999) 256. 
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and in Article 27.3 (b): plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological 
and microbiological processes. 
Adopting a narrow interpretation of the term "human being" displays adherence to 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPs Agreement. By extending patentability to inventions 
incorporating human biological material, the Patents Act will ensure that patent 
protection is available in all fields of technology. Furthermore the prohibition on 
patenting human beings as whole (if genetically modified) organisms falls within the 
permitted exception contained in Article 27.2 as being contrary to morality or "ordre 
public". Human dignity and personal freedom are safeguarded. 
In its submission to the Royal Commission on Genetic Engineering, the New 
Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys indicated that regard should be had not only to 
our international treaty obligations but also to the practice of other jurisdictions. 112 It is 
instructive to look at the European approach to this issue before evaluating the New 
Zealand Institute of Patent Attorney' s formulation for an excluding provision. 
VII EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 
A Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 
on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions 
The European Union (EU) Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions was approved by the European Parliament in 1998 in an attempt to 
harmonise the national laws of EU member states which, according to Recital 3, was 
essential to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology. 
Chapter I of the Directive is concerned with patentability, Article I stating that: 
"Member States shall protect biotechnological inventions." The requirements for 
patentability - novelty, inventive step, and susceptibility to industrial application - are 
set out in Article 3 which states that inventions that meet these criteria shall be 
112 New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys (submission to Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 200 I) 7. 
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patentable "even if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological 
material" or a process which involves such material. 
Reference to humans and human material is expressly made in Article 5: 
l The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the 
simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a 
gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions. 
2 An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a 
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural 
element. 
3 The industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be 
disclosed in the patent specification. 
Read in the light of Recital 16, Article 5(1) can be seen as respecting "the 
fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person". It "asserts 
the principle that the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, cannot 
be patented". These principles, according to Recital 16, "are in line with the criteria of 
patentability proper to patent law, whereby a mere discovery cannot be patented." 
It is arguable whether or not these principles are always "in line with" patentability 
criteria. Nonetheless, Article 5(1) read together with Article 5(2) could be interpreted 
as prohibiting - among other things - the patenting of a human being whose genome 
has been modified. A distinction is made, after all, between the whole organism (the 
body) and its elements, and it is only the elements that are deemed to be patentable 
when isolated. It could further be argued that this prohibition extends to genetically 
modified foetuses and embryos, given the reference to "the human body, at the various 
stages of its formation and development." 
Article 5(3) specifically refers to sequences or partial sequences of a gene, stating 
that industrial application of the sequence must be disclosed. In order to comply with 
this requirement: "it is necessary in cases where a sequence or partial sequence of a 
gene is used to produce a protein or part of a protein, to specify which protein or part 
of a protein is produced or what function it performs", according to Recital 24. If the 
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intention is not to allow the patenting of functionless sequences such as express 
sequence tags (ESTs), much still depends on how "industrial application" is 
interpreted, as Grubb points out. 113 Whatever arguments are put forward for the 
patenting of ESTs, at least some will apply to SNPs that also function as markers along 
the genome. 
Article 6 of the Directive lays down a further prohibition on patentability based on 
the general ground of commercial exploitation of the invention being "contrary to 
ordre public or morality". Of particular concern to Parliament are processes for cloning 
human beings and processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human 
beings, which are mentioned in Recitals 40 and 41 and expressly excluded in Article 
6(2)(a) and (b). Also excluded are uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes. Such exclusion, according to Recital 42, "does not effect inventions for 
therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are 
useful to it." 
Finally Article 6 (2)( d) expressly prohibits "processes for modifying the genetic 
identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial 
medical benefit." It would seem to follow from this that transgenic animals carrying 
copies of human genes are patentable as long as the condition related to suffering is 
met. 
The list of exclusions in Article 6(2) is not exhaustive merely illustrative, according 
to Recital 38. "Obviously" also excluded are inventions offensive to human dignity. 
In light of the unspecified scope of the morality exclusion, it is as well that Article 7 
provides that "the Commission's European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology." 
B The European Patent Convention (EPC) 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) established the European Patent 
Organisation comprising the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Administrative 
113 Philip W Grubb Patents for Chemicals, Phannaceulicals and BiotecJmology (Clarendon 
Press, Ox ford, 1999). 
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Council. 114 The Convention is adhered to by all the members of the European Union. It 
too requires that an invention be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of 
industrial application to be patentable. 115 
Article 53(a) of the EPC prohibits the grant of European patents for inventions the 
publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to (a) 'ordre public' or (b) 
morality irrespective of whether or not the invention is patentable under Article 52. 
The EPO, however, is not an instrument of the European Union and, until recently, 
the EU Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions was not 
directly applicable to its decisions.116 However, the Directive has now been 
incorporated into the Implementing Regulations of the EPC. "Its implementation by 
the Administrative Council," declared the President of the EPO in June 2000 "is an 
expression of the political will of the Organisation and the Office to respect the 
principles laid down by the European legislator and to incorporate them in European 
Patent Convention." 117 
VIII AN ANALYSIS OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF NZIPA AS ADOPTED 
BY THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON GENETIC MODIFICATION 
In its submission to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, the NZIP A 
recommended that section 17 of the Patents Act be repealed and that a new provision 
should be added to exclude humans from patentability, based on the equivalent section 
in the Australian Patents Act 1990. 11 8 
In its Report, the Royal Commission noted but did not adopt the suggestion that 
section 17 be removed, instead suggesting the establishment of Toi te Taiao: the 
114 Grubb, above, 27. 
Ill Grubb, above, 53. 
116 Grubb, above, 254. 
117 Mr Inger Kober, President of the EPO (Address to the annual press conference of the EPO, MWlich, 26 June 2000). 
118 New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys (submission to Royal Commission on Genetic Modifica tion, 200 I) I 0. 
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Bioethics Council. 119 It did however adopt without modifying NZIP A' s 
recommendation concerning a new provision advising Government: 120 
that the Patents Act 1953 be amended by adding a specific exclusion of the patentability of human beings and 
the biological processes for their generation, in line with section 18 of the Patents Act 1990 (Commonwealth). 
Consequently, an analysis of NZIP A' s recommendation devolves to some extent 
into an analysis of the Royal Commission's formulation of the amendment. 
It is arguable that the precise scope of the proposed amendment is not clear even 
though a commentary of sorts is provided in the section on "Patenting of humans"121 in 
the Report. Reference can also be made to the practice of the Australian Patent Office 
in interpreting section 18 of the Commonwealth Act. 
As noted above, the Royal Commission suggests that the amendment does nothing 
more than maintain the status quo. Nonetheless it is desirable "to put the issue beyond 
doubt", the issue being whether a "patent covering human beings would be granted". 
The amendment, it believes, merely serves to strengthen current prohibitions. 
Two parts of the legislation referred to by the Commission in support of this belief 
are sections 2 - the definition of invention - and 10(7) of the Patents Act. It 
characterises both sections as preventing the patenting of things found in nature.122 If 
reference was made to these two sections alone, then it could be stated that the 
Commission intends the amendment only to cover human beings as whole -
"unmodified" - organisms from birth onwards. It could also be stated with some 
certainty that the phrase "the biological processes for their generation", which is taken 
directly from the Commonwealth Act, might be interpreted along the lines of the 
Australiari Patent Office to cover at the very least claims to unmodified foetuses, 
embryos arid fertilised eggs.123 
119 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (Wellington 200 I) 281 . 
120 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, above, 285 . 
121 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, above, 284. 
122 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification , above, 284. 
123 Quoted in: Ministry of Commerce Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions: Discussion Paper (Wellington, 1999) 11 . 
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However, the Commission also refers to the morality section of the Patents Act, 
section 17, which is "the basis for IPONZ policy to refuse patents for humans" and 
then goes on to state: "Taken together, these patent criteria ought to mean that a patent 
cannot be obtained over a human, a human body part, or a human gene in its natural 
host, a human."124 The term "human" is not defined, but this sentence read with the 
following one suggests that the Commission means to extend the prohibition on 
patenting to cover human organisms whose genomes have been genetically 
engineered: 125 
At best a patent could be granted for a synthetic DNA molecule carrying the same 
information as found in the human body, or a method for producing a novel human 
organ or body part suitable for transplantation. 
Using the Report as an interpretative aid, it is clear that according to the Royal 
Commission isolated DNA molecules fall within the scope of patentable subject 
matter. The effect of extending the prohibition to the "biological processes for their 
generation" in the proposed amendment is otherwise somewhat uncertain for at the 
heart of these processes are DNA sequences. It is still not certain how much further 
down the scale patenting is permitted, that is, how much smaller in size than a whole 
DNA molecule. Can isolated DNA sequences that comprise a gene, DNA sequences 
such as ESTs and SNPs (if they met the utility requirement), and proteins be patented? 
Moving up the scale in size from DNA molecules, does patentability extend to 
genetically engineered organs? 
The Report states: 126 
It should be noted that the discovery of a method of producing a liver " in vitro", for 
example, would only give the patentee a right to exclude others from producing livers 
using this method. It gives no ownership rights to any person' s liver. Consequently any 
public perception that "people are being patented" is a misconception of patent law. 
If a patent can be granted on a "synthetic DNA molecule carrying the same 
information as found in the human body", can a patent not be granted on a synthetic 
124 Roya l Corrunission on Genetic Modification, above, 284. 
125 Royal Commission on Genetic Modifica tion, above, 284. 
126 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, above, 284. 
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liver - not just the method for producing it? Once the liver has been transplanted then 
the prohibition on patenting human beings might come into play, but might the 
patentee not have some form of ownership up to that time? 
Although the Royal Commission's commentary on the proposed amendment is 
confusing in places, it appears that the intention of the Report is to recommend that the 
patenting of human biological material be allowed but that the patenting of human 
beings as whole organisms including embryos and foetuses, whether or not they have 
been genetically engineered, be prohibited. In effect, it adopts the narrowest definition 
of "human being" as an organism from birth but extends the ban to exclude the 
organism in its earlier stages of development. 
It is justifiable to assume that the intended scope of the NZIP A' s ammendment is 
identical to that of the Commission's given that both recommendations are formulated 
in identical terms. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The effect of a provision excluding human beings from patentability depends on 
how the term "human being" is interpreted. There are powerful arguments for 
encouraging biotechnological inventions using human biological material, which 
suggests that New Zealand should adopt a narrow definition of the term. Despite a lack 
of clarity in its discussion of the issue, the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
appears to favour this definition, which would render unpatentable human organisms 
from birth and encompass individuals whose genome had been engineered in some 
way. How narrow the definition should be is a matter of debate. To be consistent with 
European patent law and Australian practice, though, the prohibition on patenting 
needs to cover human embryos and foetuses even if "human being" is interpreted as a 
whole organism from birth onwards. 
The way in which the excluding provision is formulated needs to be carefully 
considered. Given the ambiguities of the recommended Australian formulation, it 
might be preferable to model the provision along the lines of Articles 5 and 6 of the 
European Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. Along with 
35 
the associated Recitals, the Articles make apparent the distinction between naturally 
occurring elements that cannot be patented and isolated elements that can, between 
discovery and invention. By making much more explicit the requirement for 
disclosure of an industrial application, it goes some way to meeting the concerns of 
allowing the patenting of "upstream research". 
A provision excluding human beings as whole organisms from patentability would 
do more than put the matter beyond doubt: its inclusion is essential if section 17 is 
repealed - in the light of recent case law from Canada and New Zealand. 
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